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INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND THE STANDARD OF 
MATERIALITY: WHY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SHOULD USE THE 
REASONABLE PATENT EXAMINER STANDARD 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Alleged patent infringers frequently assert the defense of inequitable 
conduct in patent infringement suits.1  Under this defense the alleged 
infringing party must prove the patent holder intentionally misrepresented, 
withheld, or falsified material references while prosecuting its patent before the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).2  There is much dispute over what 
standard courts should use to determine whether a reference is material.3  This 
topic is important because there are serious consequences if a court determines 
a patent applicant intentionally misrepresented, withheld, or falsified material 
information.  One consequence of a court finding that inequitable conduct 
occurred in procuring a patent is a ruling that the patent in question is 
unenforceable and any other patents connected to it are also unenforceable.4 
There are many different tests courts have used to determine what 
references are material.  Before 1977, courts used a “but for” standard to 
determine whether a reference was material.5  In 1977, the PTO adopted a 
“reasonable patent examiner” subjective standard to determine whether a 
reference was material in its rule entitled “Duty to Disclose Information 
 
 1. Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 85–86 (1993). 
 2. Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(citing Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
 3. Dayco Products, 329 F.3d at 1364. 
The court has not decided whether it should adhere to the preexisting standard for 
inequitable conduct in prosecutions occurring after the effective date of the new rule.  
Thus, we have not decided whether the standard for materiality in inequitable conduct 
cases is governed by equitable principles or by the Patent Office’s rules. 
Id. (citations and footnote omitted); Scott D. Anderson, Inequitable Conduct: Persistent Problems 
and Recommended Resolutions, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 854–57 (1999); Goldman, supra note 1, 
at 72–75. 
 4. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding one patent 
unenforceable for inequitable conduct and a second patent, which issued as a divisional from the 
first patent, unenforceable for relying on the first patent). 
 5. 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03[3], at 19-218 (Matthew Bender & 
Co. 2004).  If a patent would not have issued “but for” the patent holder’s omission of the 
reference, then that reference is material.  Id; see discussion infra Parts III.A–C. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1328 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1327 
Material to Patentability” (commonly referred to as Rule 56).6  In 1992, the 
PTO amended Rule 56, adopting an objective standard focusing on prima facie 
patentability.7 
In deciding which test for materiality best serves the purposes of the 
inequitable conduct defense, there are some perceived dangers which must be 
addressed.  If the definition for materiality includes too much information, then 
it will encourage alleged infringers to assert the defense in every case, creating 
inefficiencies in the court system and increased legal fees.8  If the definition for 
materiality does not include enough information, then it will not effectively 
punish dishonest applicants or encourage applicants to disclose all information 
the PTO needs to assess patentability.9 
From Congress’s creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 until 2005, the 
court used the old Rule 56 “reasonable patent examiner” standard to determine 
materiality.10  In 2005, the Federal Circuit decided that for applications 
pending on or filed after March 16, 1992, it would use the new Rule 56 
objective standard to determine materiality.11  Because the Federal Circuit has 
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases and the Supreme Court has not 
changed the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of inequitable conduct, the Federal 
Circuit’s decisions on inequitable conduct state the current law.12 
While all of the tests courts have used to determine materiality have some 
shortcomings, this Comment argues that the Federal Circuit and the PTO 
should adopt the old Rule 56 “reasonable patent examiner” standard to 
determine whether a reference is material.  This test best furthers the main 
purpose of the doctrine of inequitable conduct, which is to punish applicants 
who intentionally misrepresent, withhold, or falsify information during the 
application process.  The old Rule 56 subjective test for determining 
materiality best serves the punishment purpose because it is expansive enough 
to give the doctrine of inequitable conduct some teeth, and it allows the court 
to make an equitable determination based on all the facts to decide whether 
 
 6. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977) (providing that “information is material where there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether 
to allow the application to issue as a patent”); see discussion infra Part III.D. 
 7. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2004) (providing that “information is material to patentability 
when . . . (1) It establishes . . . a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or (2) It refutes, or 
is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: (i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability 
relied on by the Office, or (ii) Asserting an argument of patentability”); see discussion infra Part 
III.E. 
 8. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 846–47; Jerome G. Lee, Evolution and Future of New 
Rule 56 and the Duty of Candor, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 131, 132 (1992). 
 9. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 867–68. 
 10. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 72–73. 
 11. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 12. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 67–68. 
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information is material.  Three of the other tests used for inequitable conduct 
have narrower definitions of materiality and give the court less leeway to find 
inequitable conduct based on the facts.  The last test has a broader definition of 
materiality, but it is too speculative and would create a burden on the court 
system. 
Part II of this Comment explains general concepts of the defense of 
inequitable conduct in patent infringement proceedings.  Part III explains how 
the five tests courts have used to determine materiality operate.  Part IV 
explores the general policies of inequitable conduct the standard of materiality 
should serve.  Finally, Part V gives reasons why courts should use the old Rule 
56 “reasonable patent examiner” standard. 
II.  INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IN GENERAL 
In order to obtain a patent, an inventor must comply with the statutory 
requirements of the United States Code on Patents.  To obtain a patent on an 
invention, the statutes require all inventors of the invention to file or authorize 
the filing of the patent application,13 and the invention must be of patentable 
subject matter,14 novel,15 non-obvious,16 and useful.17  The patent application 
 
 13. “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he did not himself invent the subject 
matter sought to be patented . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2000).  “An application for patent shall be 
made, or authorized to be made, by the inventor . . . .”  Id. § 111(a).  “The applicant shall make 
oath that he believes himself to be the original and first inventor of the process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or improvement thereof, for which he solicits a 
patent . . . .”  Id. § 115.  “When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall 
apply for patent jointly and each make the required oath . . . .”  Id. § 116. 
 14. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”  Id. § 101. 
 15. Id. § 102. 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— 
  (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof 
by the applicant for patent, or . . . . 
  . . . . 
  (e) the invention was described in— 
(1) an application for patent, published . . . by another filed in the United States 
before the invention by the applicant for patent or 
(2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United 
States before the invention by the applicant for patent . . . or 
  . . . . 
  (g) . . . (2) before such person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this 
country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 16. Id. § 103(a). 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject 
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must also meet the specification requirements.  The application must contain a 
specification with a written description of the invention, enabling one skilled in 
the art to practice the invention, and setting forth the best mode contemplated 
by the inventor of practicing the invention.18  The specification must end with 
claims sufficiently definite to point out and distinctly identify the subject 
matter of the invention.19  An inventor may lose the right to patent if: (1) the 
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in the United 
States or a foreign country more than one year prior to the United States patent 
application,20 (2) the invention was in public use, or on sale in the United 
States more than one year prior to the United States patent application,21 (3) 
the inventor abandoned the invention,22 or (4) the inventor patented the 
invention in a foreign country before the date of the United States patent 
application and the foreign patent application was filed more than one year 
before the United States application.23 
Even if an inventor follows all of these statutory requirements and obtains 
a valid patent on an invention, the doctrine of inequitable conduct can render 
the patent unenforceable.24  If a patentee asserts his statutory right to exclude 
 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole 
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary 
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
Id. 
 17. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, [etc.] . . . .”  Id. § 101 
(emphasis added). 
 18. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner 
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same, and 
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
Id. 
 19. “The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”  Id. § 112. 
 20. “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was patented or described 
in a printed publication in this or a foreign country . . . more than one year prior to the date of the 
application for patent in the United States . . . .”  Id. § 102(b). 
 21. “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was . . . in public use or 
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the 
United States . . . .”  Id. § 102(b) 
 22. “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he has abandoned the invention . . . .”  
Id. § 102(c). 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d). 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was first patented or caused 
to be patented . . . by the applicant . . . in a foreign country prior to the date of the 
application for patent in this country on an application for patent . . . filed more than 
twelve months before the filing of the application in the United States . . . . 
Id. 
 24. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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by bringing a suit for infringement against an alleged infringer, the alleged 
infringer may plead the statutory defense of unenforceability.25  Inequitable 
conduct falls within this statutory defense.26  If the court finds the patentee 
engaged in inequitable conduct in the procurement of the patent by 
intentionally misrepresenting, withholding, or falsifying material references, 
the court will order the patent unenforceable.27 
Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc. is a typical case where an alleged infringer 
asserted the defense of inequitable conduct in an infringement action and the 
court held patents unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.28  Molins, the 
patentee, developed a fully automated machining system that allowed 
simultaneous machining of related families of parts.29  Molins filed a U.S. 
patent on the system in 1966.30  The in-house patent agent for Molins 
responsible for prosecuting the patents in suit knew of several published 
articles that disclosed an automatic manufacturing system similar to Molins’s 
invention, but failed to disclose the articles to the PTO during prosecution of 
the patent.31  The court held Molins engaged in inequitable conduct because it 
intentionally failed to disclose material information to the PTO during patent 
prosecution.32  The court found the articles were material to patentability 
because a reasonable patent examiner would have considered them important 
in deciding the patentability of the claims in the patent application.33  The court 
reasoned that the articles were material for three reasons: (1) they disclosed 
relevant features of the claimed invention that were not found anywhere else in 
the prior art, (2) Molins disclosed the articles in foreign patent applications 
where foreign patent examiners found they were pertinent prior art, and (3) 
Molins amended its foreign claims based on the articles.34  Molins disclosed 
the articles to the PTO seventeen years after learning of them, and in a 
reexamination proceeding, the PTO found that Molins’s issued patent was 
valid in light of the articles.35  Thus, even though Molins’s patent would have 
been valid if it had disclosed the articles when first discovered, the court held 
Molins’s patent unenforceable because it engaged in inequitable conduct by 
intentionally withholding the articles for seventeen years.36 
 
 25. “The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a 
patent . . . unenforceability . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 282(1). 
 26. E.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 27. E.g., Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182. 
 28. Id. at 1172. 
 29. Id. at 1176. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1176–77. 
 32. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182. 
 33. Id. at 1180. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1177, 1179. 
 36. Id. at 1182. 
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Molins illustrates how a court may hold a patent unenforceable that 
otherwise meets all the statutory requirements of patentability.  Inequitable 
conduct can make an otherwise valid patent unenforceable. 
The current statutory basis for the defense of inequitable conduct arose 
from several acts of Congress beginning with the Patent Act of 1790, which 
allowed a private cause of action filed within one year of issuance to repeal a 
patent “obtained surreptitiously . . . or upon false suggestion.”37  Since the 
Patent Act of 1790, Congress has broadened and evolved the inequitable 
conduct defense.  The Patent Act of 1793 extended the period of filing to three 
years.38  The Patent Act of 1836 created a defense to infringement for an 
improperly obtained patent.39  The Consolidated Patent Act of 1870 made the 
defense available against an issued patent procured by a deceptive 
application.40  The current statute taken from the Patent Act of 1952 gives an 
alleged infringer a defense to infringement for “unenforceability.”41  The 
Federal Circuit holds inequitable conduct to fall within the defense of 
unenforceability.42  Even though Congress created a statutory defense for 
improperly obtained patents, courts were reluctant to recognize it until 1945, 
when the Supreme Court recognized that the public suffered injury through the 
fraudulent procurement of patents.43  Before 1945 courts were reluctant to 
allow a third party to raise as a defense to infringement that the patentee 
fraudulently procured the patent, because of the common law fraud 
requirement that there be injury to the party alleging fraud.44  Previously, the 
 
 37. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111; Goldman, supra note 1, at 39–40. 
 38. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323; Goldman, supra note 1, at 39–40. 
 39. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 15, 5 Stat. 117, 123; Goldman, supra note 1, at 40–42. 
 40. Consolidated Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208; Goldman, supra note 
1, at 42–45. 
 41. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); Goldman, supra note 1, at 52.  “The following shall be defenses 
in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: (1) 
Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 282 
(emphasis added). 
 42. E.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed Cir. 1984). 
 43. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see Goldman, supra note 1, at 38–39, 50–
51, from which much of the material for this paragraph was derived. 
The possession and assertion of patent rights are “issues of great moment to the 
public.” . . . A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. . . . The far-
reaching social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a 
paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from 
fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their 
legitimate scope. 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815–16 (1945) (internal 
citations omitted).  “Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office or who are 
parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising duty to report to it all facts 
concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying the applications in issue.”  Id. at 818. 
 44. Goldman, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND THE STANDARD OF MATERIALITY 1333 
view was that in a patent case any misrepresentations were made to the 
government and thus a private party did not have a right to raise the defense 
because it had not suffered an injury.45  It was in the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Precision Instrument that the Court recognized fraud in obtaining a patent 
not only injured the government, but also the public at large.46 
While Congress created a statutory base for inequitable conduct, the 
doctrine is a product of common law and legislation.47  The Rules and 
Regulations of the Department of Commerce, promulgated by the PTO, 
contain Rule 56, a rule which imposes upon applicants a “Duty to Disclose 
Information Material to Patentability.”48  For applications pending before 
March 16, 1992, the Federal Circuit uses Rule 56 adopted in 1977, but for 
applications pending on or filed after March 16, 1992, the Federal Circuit uses 
Rule 56 adopted in 1992.49 
The defense of inequitable conduct is based on the equity principle that “he 
who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”50  Inequitable conduct is 
a defense to patent infringement arising when a patent applicant intentionally 
misrepresents a material fact, fails to disclose material information, or submits 
false material information.51  To prove inequitable conduct the alleged 
infringing party must show by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant 
misrepresented, withheld, or falsified material information during the 
prosecution of the patent and that the applicant intended its deceptive 
conduct.52  Courts perform the inequitable conduct analysis in two steps.53  
First, the court determines whether the information misrepresented, withheld, 
or falsified meets threshold levels of both (1) materiality and (2) intent to 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.; Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at  815–16. 
 47. Anderson, supra note 3, at 854.  Anderson’s article provided much of the information for 
this section of the Comment. 
 48. Id.; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2004).  The PTO has the power to promulgate rules of this 
nature under 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).  “The Office . . . may establish regulations, not inconsistent 
with law, which . . . shall be made in accordance with section 553 of title 5 . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 
2(b)(2). 
 49. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 50. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814; Anderson, supra note 3, at 850.  “[T]he doors of a 
court of equity [are closed] to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter 
in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant.”  
Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814.  “[W]hile ‘equity does not demand that its suitors shall 
have led blameless lives,’ as to other matters, it does require that they shall have acted fairly and 
without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue.”  Id. at 814–15 (internal citations omitted). 
 51. Anderson, supra note 3, at 852; Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 
F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 52. E.g., Dayco Products, 329 F.3d at 1362–63. 
 53. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1334 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1327 
deceive.54  Second, the court weighs the materiality and intent to determine 
whether the applicant’s conduct was so culpable as to render the patent 
invalid.55  “Materiality and intent are . . . factual issues, but the ultimate 
determination of inequitable conduct is an equitable issue committed to the 
discretion of the trial court.”56 
There is a minimum level of proof that an alleged infringer must offer in 
order to establish a prima facie showing of inequitable conduct.57  An alleged 
infringer who asserts the defense of inequitable conduct for failure to disclose 
“must offer clear and convincing proof of: (1) prior art or information that is 
material; (2) knowledge chargeable to applicant of that prior art or information 
and of its materiality; and (3) failure of the applicant to disclose the art or 
information resulting from an intent to mislead the PTO.”58 
After the alleged infringer gives this offer of proof, the applicant has five 
primary ways to rebut the charge.59 
[Inequitable conduct] may be rebutted by a showing that: (a) the prior art or 
information was not material (e.g., because it is less pertinent than or merely 
cumulative with prior art or information cited to or by the PTO); (b) if the prior 
art or information was material, a showing that applicant did not know of that 
art or information; (c) if applicant did know of that art or information, a 
showing that applicant did not know of its materiality; [or] (d) [applicant’s 
nondisclosure did not intend] to mislead the PTO.60 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. E.g., id.  There may be a lesser showing of materiality where high levels of intent to 
deceive are present.  Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1439 (Fed Cir. 
1991).  “The more material the omission, the less culpable the intent required, and vice versa.”  
Id. 
 56. Anderson, supra note 3, at 853–54 (citing Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular 
Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1439–40). 
 57. Anderson, supra note 3, at 853; see FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 
(Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 58. FMC Corp., 835 F.3d at 1415 (footnote omitted); Anderson, supra note 3, at 853 n.60.  
The requisite element of intent has undergone change over the years.  Until 1988 the Federal 
Circuit used a gross negligence standard from which the court could infer the required intent to 
deceive.  See Lynn C. Tyler, Kingsdown Fifteen Years Later: What Does It Take to Prove 
Inequitable Conduct?, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 267, 272–73 (2003).  In 1988, the Federal Circuit held 
that gross negligence was not enough to infer intent to deceive and that for a finding of intent to 
deceive, there must be “sufficient culpability” when viewing all the evidence of the involved 
persons.  Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(en banc).  In doing so the court rejected prior panel holdings that the court could infer intent to 
deceive when an attorney knew a reference was material and did not disclose it to the PTO during 
prosecution.  Tyler, supra, at 268. 
 59. Anderson, supra note 3, at 853. 
 60. FMC Corp., 835 F.2d at 1415; see Anderson, supra note 3, at 853. 
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Good faith on the part of the applicant is an additional factor which may rebut 
a prima facie case of inequitable conduct.61 
During prosecution of a patent the applicant submits information to the 
PTO.  The applicant has a duty of candor and good faith to not withhold or 
misrepresent information material to patentability when submitting information 
to the PTO.62  Examples of types of information an applicant must submit to 
the PTO in order to meet the duty of candor and good faith include: (1) prior 
art references not known to the examiner,63 (2) conduct relevant to statutory 
bars,64 (3) experimental data,65 (4) date of invention affidavit,66 and (5) foreign 
 
 61. Anderson, supra note 3, at 853; see Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 
1330 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[E]vidence of good faith must be considered in determining whether 
inequitable conduct has been shown by clear and convincing evidence.  However, good faith is 
only one factor to be considered along with the totality of the evidence.” (citation omitted)). 
 62. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977); Anderson, supra note 3, at 855–56. 
 63. Anderson, supra note 3, at 856; see, e.g., Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 
1184–85 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applicant withheld articles describing a machine similar to the claims 
of the invention). 
  Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) an application for patent may not issue if the invention was 
already known of before the date of invention by the applicant.  “[T]he invention was known or 
used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign 
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
  Prior art references are also important in determining whether the invention was not 
obvious at the time of invention. 
  A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole 
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary 
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
Id. § 103(a).  However, the applicant cannot commit inequitable conduct by failing to cite prior 
art that he has no knowledge of, or which he believes is less relevant than other art already cited 
to the PTO.  CHISUM, supra note 5, § 19.03[2][b][ii], at 19-184. 
 64. Anderson, supra note 3, at 856; see, e.g., Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., 
Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applicant withheld information from the PTO 
regarding its prior sale of the invention claimed); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding patent invalid where applicant 
withheld evidence regarding public use and sale of the invention more than one year prior to 
when the application was filed). 
  Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) an application for patent may not issue if it was not filed 
within one year of the invention’s patenting, description, public use, or sale in the United States 
or a foreign country.  “[T]he invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this 
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the 
date of the application for patent in the United States . . . .”  Id. 
  Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) an application for patent may not issue if the applicant 
patented it in a foreign country based upon an application filed more than one year before the date 
of application in the United States. 
  [T]he invention was first patented or caused to be patented . . . by the applicant . . . in 
a foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an 
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patent office search reports on a companion application.67  The Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure68 identifies three other sources of information that 
are material and which an applicant must disclose: (1) information relating to 
 
application for patent or inventor’s certificate filed more than twelve months before the 
filing of the application in the United States . . . . 
Id.  § 102(d). 
 65. Anderson, supra note 3, at 856; see Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 
1556, 1570–71 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (applicant submitted falsified affidavits under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 
(“Rule 132”) to the PTO regarding experimental data relevant to its claimed invention).  If an 
examiner rejects a patent applicant’s claim on the ground that it closely resembles products or 
processes in the prior art, the applicant may rebut this prima facie case of obviousness by filing an 
affidavit under Rule 132.  Using Rule 132 an applicant may present test evidence that shows how 
its invention is substantially different from the prior art.  Similarly, an applicant may present 
technical data and experimental evidence in the specification of its patent application.  In both 
situations there is a great need to prevent fraudulent conduct, because the PTO has no way of 
verifying the tests through its own independent procedures. 
 66. Anderson, supra note 3, at 856; see Timely Prod. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 298 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (applicant filed an affidavit under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (“Rule 131”) which misled the 
patent examiner into granting the applicant an earlier date of invention than the applicant was 
entitled to).  A date of invention affidavit is filed when an applicant is faced with a rejection 
based on prior art shown to exist before his date of application.  The applicant may file this 
affidavit in order to show that he invented the subject matter sought to be patented before the 
prior art was invented, patented, or published.  This affidavit is filed under Rule 131, which 
states: 
When any claim of an application . . . is rejected, the inventor of the subject matter of the 
rejected claim . . . may submit an appropriate oath or declaration to establish invention of 
the subject matter of the rejected claim prior to the effective date of the reference or 
activity on which the rejection is based. 
37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (2005).  Because the PTO normally relies upon affidavits submitted under Rule 
131 as sufficient on their face, the doctrine of inequitable conduct and the penalties resulting from 
it are necessary to ensure full, truthful disclosure by an applicant.  See generally CHISUM, supra 
note 5, § 19.03[2][c], at 19-208. 
 67. Anderson, supra note 3, at 856; see Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG v. Hantscho 
Commercial Prod., Inc., 21 F.3d 1068, 1072–73 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applicant found not to have 
engaged in inequitable conduct where it withheld from the PTO the basis for the rejection of an 
identical European patent because it did so accidentally and without the requisite intent to 
deceive).  However, the court must exercise caution when basing a finding of inequitable conduct 
on proceedings in foreign jurisdictions because of “differences in disclosure requirements, claim 
practice, form of application, and standard of patentability.”  Molins, 48 F.3d at 1180. 
 68. “This Manual [of Patent Examining Procedure] is published to provide [PTO] patent 
examiners, applicants, [and] attorneys . . . with a reference work on the practices and procedures 
relative to the prosecution of patent applications before the USPTO. . . . The Manual does not 
have the force of law or the force of the rules in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations.”  
Foreword to U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed., rev. 2005) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
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or from co-pending United States patent applications, (2) information from 
related litigation, and (3) information relating to claims copied from a patent.69 
The consequences of a court finding that an applicant engaged in 
inequitable conduct can be very severe.  Some of the possible sanctions 
delivered by courts include: invalidity, unenforceability, cancellation suit, 
attorney’s fees, antitrust liability, liability under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, liability under securities laws, recovery of royalties, loss of attorney–
client and work product privileges, disciplinary action against attorneys and 
agents, RICO liability, and state law tort claims for unfair competition.70 
Over the years courts have used several different tests to determine 
whether a reference is material.  Before 1977, courts used a “but for” standard 
to determine if a reference was material.71  In 1977, the PTO adopted a 
“reasonable patent examiner” subjective standard in Rule 56 to determine 
whether a reference is material.72  In 1992, the PTO adopted an objective 
standard focusing on prima facie patentability.73  The Federal Circuit recently 
decided to use the old Rule 56 standard for applications pending before March 
16, 1992, and the new Rule 56 test for applications pending on or filed after 
March 16, 1992.74  The remainder of this Comment focuses on the tests courts 
have used to determine materiality, the general purposes behind inequitable 
conduct that the test for materiality should serve, and what test for materiality 
best serves the main purpose of the inequitable conduct doctrine. 
 
 69. Id. § 2001.06(b)–(d).  Rule 56(a) also gives two examples of where the PTO encourages 
applicants to look for material information: “(1) [p]rior art cited in search reports of a foreign 
patent office in a counterpart application, and (2) [t]he closest information over which individuals 
associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application believe any pending claim 
patentably defines, to make sure that any material information contained therein is disclosed to 
the [PTO].”  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2005). 
 70. See CHISUM, supra note 5, § 19.03[6], at 19-353; Glenn E. Von Tersch, Curing the 
Inequitable Conduct Plague in Patent Litigation, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 425–28 
(1998). 
 71. CHISUM, supra note 5, § 19.03[3], at 19-218.  If a patent would not have issued “but for” 
the patent holder’s omission of the reference then that reference is material.  Id.; see infra Parts 
III.A–C. 
 72. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977) (since amended) (providing that “information is material where 
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in 
deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent”); see infra Part III.D. 
 73. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2004) (providing that “information is material to patentability 
when . . . (1) [i]t establishes . . . a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or (2) [i]t refutes, 
or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: (i) [o]pposing an argument of 
unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (ii) [a]sserting an argument of patentability”); see infra 
Part III.E. 
 74. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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III.  EXPLANATION OF TESTS USED TO DETERMINE MATERIALITY 
The test for materiality has evolved over the years.  From 1945, when the 
Supreme Court recognized in Precision Instrument that fraudulently procured 
patents harmed the public, until 1982, when Congress created the Federal 
Circuit, the circuit courts individually determined what test to use for 
inequitable conduct.75  Prior to the 1977 amendment of Rule 56, courts used 
three different “but for” tests to determine materiality.76  Under the “objective 
but for” test a reference is material only if it would have precluded the issuing 
of the patent were it disclosed.77  Under the “subjective but for” test, if a patent 
issues based on fraudulent misrepresentations then the information withheld or 
misrepresented is deemed to be material.78  The “but it may have” test finds 
materiality in information which if disclosed may have precluded the issuance 
of the patent.79  Rule 56, as amended in 1977, provided: “[I]nformation is 
material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner 
would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to 
issue as a patent.”80  In 1992 the PTO amended Rule 56 to provide for a more 
objective test on what information it deemed material to patentability.81  Under 
the new Rule 56, information is material if “[i]t establishes . . . a prima facie 
case of unpatentability of a claim.”82  The “objective but for” test, “subjective 
but for” test, and “but it may have” test are no longer used by the Federal 
Circuit to determine materiality.  Currently the Federal Circuit uses the old 
Rule 56 reasonable patent examiner standard for patent applications pending 
before March 16, 1992, and the new Rule 56 standard for patents pending on 
or filed after March 16, 1992.83 
A. “Objective But For” Test 
The first “but for” test is called the “objective but for” test.  This test finds 
materiality in a reference only if the reference would have precluded the 
 
 75. Goldman, supra note 1, at 52–67 (discussing the development of the inequitable conduct 
doctrine in the circuit courts from 1945–1982). 
 76. CHISUM, supra note 5, § 19.03[3][a], at 19-219–20. 
 77. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965); In 
re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. 1353, 1368 (D. Del. 1975); Goldman, 
supra note 1, at 55. 
 78. American Cyanamid Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 363 F.2d 757, 778 (6th Cir. 1966); 
Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. at 1368; Goldman, supra note 1, at 54. 
 79. Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. at 1368–69; SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 318 
F.Supp. 433, 449–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 80. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977). 
 81. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2004). 
 82. Id. at § 1.56(b). 
 83. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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issuing of the patent.84  To apply this test the court must first make a 
determination of invalidity based on the prior art that was not disclosed.85  This 
test for materiality would make the doctrine of inequitable conduct mostly 
unnecessary because if a patent is invalid based on a reference, it is invalid 
regardless of whether the inventor withheld the reference.86  However, courts 
have applied this test in antitrust actions as one of the necessary predicates to 
find that a patentee committed an antitrust violation by fraudulently exploiting 
an invalid patent.87  The “objective but for” test is the narrowest test for 
materiality.  A clear example of how this test is applied is the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Walker Process Equipment v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.88 
In Walker Process, a patentee brought a suit for infringement against an 
alleged infringer.89 The alleged infringer denied infringement and 
counterclaimed, alleging the patentee violated the antitrust laws by 
fraudulently exploiting its invalid patent.90  The court found the patent invalid 
because during prosecution the applicant withheld that its invention was in 
public use more than one year prior to the filing of its patent application.91  
Under oath the applicant stated it did not know the invention was in public use 
in the United States more than one year prior to its application.92  However, the 
applicant knew its invention was in public use in the United States more than 
one year prior to the application, because it sold and installed equipment 
covered by the claims in the application.93  The court reasoned that but for this 
withholding of information the patent would not have issued.94  If the applicant 
was truthful and told the PTO about the prior use and sale, then the invention 
claimed in the application would not have met the statutory requirements to 
obtain a patent and the PTO would not have issued the patent.95 
 
 84. Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. at 1368. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970).  The doctrine of inequitable 
conduct would still help where the prior art reference did not anticipate all of the patent’s claims 
because it would render the entire patent unenforceable. 
 87. Raymond P. Niro et al., Nonstatutory Defenses in Patent Infringement Suits: Where Did 
They Come From? Where Are They Going?, 320 PRACTISING LAW INST., PATENTS, 
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 711, 749–50 
(1991). 
 88. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
 89. Id. at 173. 
 90. Id. at 173–74. 
 91. Id. at 174; see 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 92. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See note 21 and accompanying text. 
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B. “Subjective But For” Test 
The second “but for” test is called the “subjective but for” test.  This test 
evolved from the “objective but for” test and finds materiality in instances 
where the “objective but for” test does not.96  The “subjective but for” test 
focuses on the effect that any fraudulent misrepresentations, had on the 
examiner.97  If the examiner issued the patent in reliance on 
misrepresentations, then the references are material.98  One case applying the 
“subjective but for” test of materiality is American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC.99 
American Cyanamid Co. involved an appeal from a Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) decision holding that drug companies violated the Federal 
Trade Commission Act by engaging in a price fixing scheme with the 
antibiotic tetracycline.100  Central to this holding was the FTC’s finding that 
the drug companies deliberately made false and misleading statements to the 
PTO and that they withheld material information from the PTO in order to 
secure a patent on tetracycline.101  The Sixth Circuit remanded the case in 
order to determine what, if any, effect these alleged misrepresentations had on 
the patent examiner who granted the tetracycline patent.102  In the FTC 
hearing, the patent examiner did not testify despite repeated requests by the 
drug companies that the examiner testify, because the FTC found it would be 
against PTO policy.103  The court found that the FTC could subpoena the 
examiner as a witness, and it was necessary for the examiner to testify in order 
to support the FTC’s holding.104  The court noted, “[T]he ultimate questions 
are: Did [the patent examiner] receive all the information that he requested 
from [the drug company]?  And was [the patent examiner] mislead [sic] and 
deceived by [the drug companies] and did he grant the tetracycline patent as 
the result of such deception?”105  Thus, here is a clear example of what 
constitutes materiality under the “subjective but for” test.  The test focuses on 
the state of mind of the actual patent examiner who issued the patent. 
 
 96. Goldman, supra note 1, at 55–60. 
 97. Jerome G. Lee et al., Equitable Defenses in Patent Cases, 320 PRACTISING LAW INST., 
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 571, 
580–81 (1991). 
 98. See id. 
 99. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966). 
 100. Id. at 760. 
 101. Id. at 772. 
 102. Id. at 779. 
 103. Id. at 778. 
 104. American Cyanamid, 363 F.2d at 779. 
 105. Id. at 778. 
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C. “But It May Have” Test 
The third “but for” test is called the “but it may have” test.  This test 
encompasses even more material than the “subjective but for” test.106  This test 
looks to whether misrepresentations in prosecution may have had an effect on 
the examiner.107  One court described the test thusly: “[A] misrepresentation 
which makes it ‘impossible for the Patent Office fairly to assess [the] 
application against the prevailing statutory criteria,’ will, given the requisite 
intent, lead to a finding of invalidity.”108  The court in SCM Corp. v. Radio 
Corp. of America used this test to analyze the materiality of withheld 
information.109 
In SCM Corp., the PTO denied the applicant’s initial application based on 
the prior art.110  In order to strengthen its application, the applicant conducted 
testing to distinguish its invention from the prior art and filed the test results in 
support of its application.111  In filing the affidavit with the test results, the 
applicant withheld subsequent test data which contradicted its first test 
results.112  After several amendments, the PTO granted the applicant’s 
patent.113  The court found under both the objective and subjective “but for” 
tests that the withheld test data was not material.114  However, the court still 
held the patent unenforceable because of the withheld test data.115  The court 
reasoned that “any inequitable conduct on the part of the applicant in obtaining 
a patent will be sufficient to dissuade a court of equity from rendering him its 
aid in enforcing the patent against infringers.”116  In so holding, the court 
 
 106. Lee et al., supra note 97, at 581. 
 107. Id. 
 108. In re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. 1353, 1369 (D. Del. 1975) 
(alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).  The court in Frost Patent found a patent invalid 
where the applicant “knew or should have known that the undisclosed information in its 
possession could have refuted the arguments it was making to the Patent Office.”  Id. at 1373.  In 
addition, “A misrepresentation is material when its existence might have influenced a patent 
examiner.”  Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 497 F.Supp. 661, 689 (D. Del. 1980).  The 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks also adopted this test in In re Altenpohl, 198 U.S.P.Q. 
289, 310 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1976) (“Further, the materiality of the prior art withheld need not 
necessarily be such that applicant or counsel believed it would render any of the claims 
unpatentable.  It need only be such that the patent might not have issued had full disclosure been 
made.”). 
 109. 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 110. Id. at 440. 
 111. Id. at 444. 
 112. Id. at 446. 
 113. Id. 
 114. SCM Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 449. 
 115. Id. at 450. 
 116. Id. at 449.  The court went on to state: 
No one can tell with certainty what would have happened if [the applicant] had dealt 
fairly with the Patent Office.  But the fact remains that [the applicant] did withhold 
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rejected both the subjective and objective “but for” tests for materiality and 
focused on whether the withheld information was relevant.117  Thus, the court 
expanded the test for materiality beyond that which would be included in the 
objective or subjective “but for” tests.  Later courts named the test used in 
SCM Corp. the “but it may have” test.118 
D. Old Rule 56 Subjective Test 
In 1977, the PTO amended Rule 56 to state that “information is material 
where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would 
consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a 
patent.”119  The Federal Circuit has stated that courts may use several tests in 
determining the minimum threshold of materiality, but PTO Rule 56 is the 
appropriate starting point.120  The Federal Circuit accepted this guideline by 
noting that it is meant to describe how an applicant ought to conduct business 
with the PTO.121  The Federal Circuit has noted that “the pertinent inquiry is 
not whether a reasonable examiner would want to be aware of a particular 
thing, but whether, after he was aware of it, he would ‘consider it important’ in 
deciding whether to reject one or more claims.”122 
A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp. illustrates how courts apply the 
reasonable patent examiner test.123  In A.B. Dick, the inventor knew of prior 
references disclosing methods similar to what he regarded as the most 
important part of his invention.124  However, neither the inventor nor his 
attorney disclosed the references to the PTO during prosecution of the 
patent.125  Six years into prosecution of the patent, the examiner found the 
references and rejected claims in the application based on them.126  The 
 
relevant facts.  Which side in this litigation is to suffer from this conduct?  It is 
appropriate that it should be [the applicant] who suffers. . . . The evidence here justifies 
the conclusion that this court should not enforce a patent obtained under these 
circumstances. 
Id. at 449–50. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. 1353, 1368 (D. 
Del. 1975). 
 119. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977). 
 120. See Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1440 (Fed Cir. 1991); 
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed Cir. 1984); Am. Hoist & Derrick 
Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 121. See Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1440; Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1363. 
 122. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1363 n.2. 
 123. 798 F.2d 1392, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  The invention in this case was ink jet printing.  
Id. at 1393. 
 124. Id. at 1397. 
 125. Id. at 1396. 
 126. Id. at 1397. 
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applicant amended the claims, and the examiner allowed the amended claims 
in light of the references the applicant withheld but the examiner eventually 
discovered.127  The court held that the applicant engaged in inequitable conduct 
by intentionally withholding the prior art references.128  The court used the 
“reasonable patent examiner” standard to determine if the prior references 
were material.129  The court found that the prior references were material 
because: (1) the inventor stated that the references described methods similar 
to his, (2) the inventor stated that these methods were the “most important 
part” of his invention, and (3) after the examiner found the references, the 
examiner rejected claims in the application.130  Thus, the court noted it was 
obvious that a reasonable examiner would have considered the references 
important in examining a patent, because here the references actually resulted 
in changing the patent.131 
The patent bar criticized the decision in this case because the court held a 
patent invalid based on the applicant’s failure to disclose references that the 
examiner subsequently discovered before the patent issued.132  However, this is 
a clear example of how the “reasonable patent examiner” test operates.  The 
result in this case would come out different today after a 1992 amendment to 
the rules, because the new rules allow an applicant to submit material 
information at any time before a patent issues, without penalty, so long as the 
applicant follows certain procedures.133 
E. Current Rule 56 Objective Test 
The PTO issued a new standard of materiality in 1992 which focused on 
more objective determinations of what is material information.134 
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to 
information already of record . . . and 
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima 
facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or 
 
 127. Id. at 1398. 
 128. A.B. Dick Co., 798 F.2d at 1400. 
 129. Id. at 1398. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See e.g., Lee et al., supra note 97, at 591. 
 133. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.97–98 (2005).  Rule 1.97 sets time requirements on when the applicant 
must file an information disclosure statement.  37 C.F.R. § 1.97.  Rule 1.98 requires the 
information disclosure statement to include “[a] list of all patents, publications, applications, or 
other information submitted for consideration by the [PTO].”  37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(1).  Rule 1.98 
also requires a legible copy of the information submitted, a concise explanation of the relevance 
of any information not in English or a translation, and other procedural requirements.  37 C.F.R. § 
1.98(a)(2)–(3). 
 134. Id. § 1.56(b). 
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(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: 
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or 
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability. 
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the information 
compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of 
evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest 
reasonable construction consistent with the specification, and before any 
consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to 
establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.135 
From 1982 until 2005, the Federal Circuit used the old Rule 56 standard to 
determine materiality.136  Recently, the Federal Circuit decided that for patent 
applications pending on or filed after March 16, 1992, it will use the new Rule 
56 standard to determine materiality.137 
In Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
addressed whether or not the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
to an alleged infringer because of inequitable conduct by an applicant.138  The 
court held the district court erred in granting summary judgment with respect 
to the applicant’s failure to cite three references in its application.139  For the 
first reference, the court held that a concurrent patent application filed by the 
applicant was material to the patent in suit under both the old Rule 56 and new 
Rule 56.140  However, the alleged infringer failed to meet its burden under 
summary judgment to prove the requisite intent to deceive.141  For the second 
reference, the court held that the alleged infringer failed to show a prior patent 
met either standard of materiality.142  For the third reference, the court held that 
a contrary decision of another examiner reviewing a similar claim met either 
standard of materiality.143  However, the court did not address whether the 
applicant met its standard to prove intent to deceive.144 
The Federal Circuit in Dayco Products stated that for patent applications 
prosecuted before the PTO’s 1992 change in Rule 56 it would use the 
“reasonable patent examiner” standard for materiality.145  The applicant filed 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 72–73. 
 137. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 138. 329 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. at 1365–66. 
 141. Id. at 1366. 
 142. Id. at 1367. 
 143. Dayco Products, 329 F.3d at 1368. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1364. 
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three of the patents-in-suit in Dayco after the January 17, 1992 change in Rule 
56.146  However, the court did not resolve which standard of materiality it 
would use because it found that under either test the outcome was the same 
with respect to the three withheld references at issue.147  Presently, the Federal 
Circuit analyzes materiality for patents pending on or filed after March 16, 
1992, under the new Rule 56 test.148 
Since inequitable conduct defenses first started popping up in patent 
infringement suits, the standard of materiality has been broadened from the 
objective “but for” standard to the “reasonable patent examiner” standard.  
With the adoption of new Rule 56, the PTO attempted to narrow the standard 
in order to fix perceived problems created by the broadening of the rule. 
IV.  POLICIES OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
Before deciding on which materiality test best serves the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct, it is important to look at the policies behind inequitable 
conduct to determine which test best promotes the most important policies of 
inequitable conduct.  Three purposes the doctrine of inequitable conduct serves 
are: (1) to punish an applicant for misrepresenting information, falsifying 
information, or lying during examination proceedings, (2) to make sure the 
patent examiner has all pertinent information when making a determination on 
patentability, and (3) to minimize the burden on the court system of frivolous 
inequitable conduct claims and promote the certainty of patents.  Arguably, the 
most valuable patents are litigated, and litigation effectively brings any 
withheld information to light.  As such, the standard of materiality used by the 
courts should conform to the first purpose of the inequitable conduct doctrine, 
punishing a dishonest applicant, while also addressing concerns of the third 
purpose, minimizing the burden on the courts and promoting the certainty of 
patents. 
A. Punishing Dishonest Applicants 
The first purpose of the inequitable conduct doctrine is to punish an 
applicant who misrepresents information, falsifies information, or lies during 
examination proceedings.149  This purpose of inequitable conduct doctrine 
comes from the equity maxim that “he who comes into equity must come with 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 149. See John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place of 
Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 234 (1999) 
(“Alternatively, we may wish to uphold traditional inequitable conduct doctrine by punishing 
behavior we wish to deter, rather than by exploring the consequences of that behavior.”). 
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clean hands.”150  In defining materiality in this context a balance must be 
struck between two sides.  First, the definition of materiality must be expansive 
enough for it to have any real meaning.  If the definition only encompasses 
information that would invalidate a patent, then without inequitable conduct 
the patent would inevitably be invalid anyway.151  However, as the definition 
becomes more expansive there becomes more of an incentive for alleged 
infringers to charge inequitable conduct during litigation proceedings.152  This 
will prolong litigation, as the court system must determine whether an 
applicant engaged in inequitable conduct with respect to withheld 
information.153  It also may result in taking away patent protection for worthy 
inventions just because a patentee did not disclose some trivial matter.154 
B. Making Sure the Patent Examiner Has All Pertinent Information 
The second purpose of inequitable conduct doctrine, making sure the 
examiner has all pertinent information, is set out in Rule 56.  The rule states, 
“A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest.  The public 
interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, 
at the time an application is being examined, the [PTO] is aware of and 
evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability.”155  The 
decision in Precision Instrument, one of the first cases finding a patent 
unenforceable for inequitable conduct, also supports this purpose.156  The 
Court stated that a patent affects the public interest.157  Patents serve the public 
purpose of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts by giving the 
patent holder a monopoly in his invention.158  The public has a valid interest in 
denying a patent monopoly where the patentee engaged in inequitable conduct 
or fraud to obtain his patent.159  Therefore, a patentee must come into an 
infringement suit with clean hands.160 
However, the statutory requirements for a patent are adequate to make sure 
the examiner has all pertinent information.  If an applicant does not disclose 
 
 150. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945); see 
supra note 50. 
 151. See supra Part III.A.  However, inequitable conduct would still help in situations where a 
prior art reference does not anticipate all of a patent’s claims. 
 152. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 89; Rene D. Tegtmeyer, A Refocusing on Inequitable 
Conduct in New Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 194 (1992). 
 153. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 846–47; Lee, supra note 8, at 132. 
 154. See John F. Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability 
Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7, 9 (1988). 
 155. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2005). 
 156. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 157. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. 
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some material information during the examination process and the patent is 
litigated, the information will come to light during litigation.  To accomplish 
this, some interested party must copy the patented device or method and either 
sue the patent holder for declaratory judgment or be sued by the patent holder 
for infringement.161  Then, the alleged infringing party will bring to light all 
information possible in order to secure a ruling invalidating the patent, 
including any information the patent holder withheld during prosecution of the 
patent.  If a patent is not litigated, and material information was withheld from 
the PTO during prosecution, then obviously litigation will not help to bring the 
information to light.  For a non-litigated patent there are two possible 
scenarios: (1) if the applicant disclosed the withheld information the patent 
would not have issued, or (2) even if the applicant disclosed the withheld 
information the patent would still have issued.  In the next three sections of this 
Comment, the arguments as they pertain to non-litigated bad patents, non-
litigated valid patents, and litigated patents are addressed, concluding that 
inequitable conduct is not necessary to make sure the examiner has all 
pertinent information.  After that discussion is a focus on reexamination 
proceedings and why they do not solve the problems created by high cost 
patent litigation. 
1. Non-litigated Bad Patent 
In the first scenario, where the applicant withheld material information and 
the PTO would not have granted the patent if the applicant disclosed the 
information, there is an invalid patent out in the marketplace potentially 
deterring others from practicing what was patented.  Some noted commentators 
have given reasons why the perceived social costs from this scenario are not all 
that great. 
One study showed that litigation is more likely to occur early on in the life 
of a patent and the most valuable patents are litigated.162  The study showed 
that if a patent is litigated the most probable time for the litigation to end is 
 
 161. “A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”  35 U.S.C. 
§ 281 (2000).  What constitutes infringement of a patent is set out in 35 U.S.C. § 271: 
“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within 
the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the 
patent therefore, infringes the patent.”  The Declaratory Judgment Act states, 
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . .  any court of the United States, 
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations 
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could 
be sought.  Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or 
decree and shall be reviewable as such. 
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000). 
 162. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 460 (2004).  This study based 
its findings on the assumption that litigated patents are valuable patents and that value is 
measured by the economic benefit an individual patent has to its owner.  Id. at 439–40. 
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three years from the date of issuance of the patent and that as time passes the 
probability drops.163  Therefore, the authors of the study reasoned that it is rare 
for a patent to become valuable and be litigated late in its life.164  Based on this 
study, the social cost of relying on litigation to bring out information is lower 
than expected because the most valuable patents will be litigated, and that 
litigation will happen early in the life of the patent. 
Another noted author on the subject, Mark A. Lemley, has asserted that 
litigation is more economically feasible to weed out bad patents than is 
strengthening the examination process.165  Lemley countered potential 
objections to his argument.  In response to what he termed “in terrorem 
effects” (the concern that potential competitors will be deterred from entering a 
field because of the existence of patents owned by their competitors), Lemley 
argued that for bad patents that are neither litigated nor licensed, potential 
competitors will not even be aware of them and thus will not be deterred.166  
Thus, inequitable conduct is not needed to stop bad patents from entering the 
marketplace, because if the patent is valuable it will be litigated and if it is 
neither valuable nor litigated, then its holder likely will not enforce it. 
2. Non-litigated Valid Patent 
In the second scenario, where the applicant withheld material information 
but the PTO still would have granted the patent if the applicant disclosed the 
information, there is no reason why this information needs to come to light, 
whether through the applicant disclosing it (for fear that if the applicant did not 
the applicant could be subject to inequitable conduct), or through litigation.  
The PTO may prefer that applicants disclose information such as this if it is a 
close call, but in the end if the patent is valid, the patent is valid. 
3. Problems in Relying on Litigation 
In the third scenario—where the applicant withheld material information, 
obtained a patent, and the patent is litigated—relying on litigation to bring all 
material information to light has some drawbacks.  First, it creates a drag on 
the court system to rely on litigation to bring out information.167  Second, it 
costs a lot of money for an interested party to copy a patented method or 
 
 163. See id. at 477.  The data for this study came from “all issued U.S. patents from 1963 
through 1999 (2,925,537 patents in total) [compared] with all patents for which a lawsuit was 
filed in any federal court and which terminated during 1999–2000 (6,861 patents in total).”  Id. at 
445 (internal citation omitted). 
 164. Id. at 460. 
 165. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1531–32 (2001). 
 166. Id. at 1516–17. 
 167. But see id. at 1510–11 (arguing that it is more cost effective to deal with bad patents 
through litigation than through stronger examination proceedings). 
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device and then enter into litigation in an attempt to secure a ruling 
invalidating the patent.168  Because of this cost deterrence, there may be a long 
period of time before an interested party with enough money will challenge the 
patent in light of the undisclosed information. 
In a recent article, Joseph Farrell and Robert P. Merges discussed why 
litigation does not work to fix prosecution errors.169  They believe that because 
of economic factors the patentee has more of an incentive to win in patent 
litigation and that because of this skewed incentive the patentee will spend 
more money to win litigation.170  They also make the assumption that the side 
that spends the most money in litigation is more likely to win.171  Thus, 
because of economic incentives the patentee is more likely to win in litigation.  
The economic factors giving the patentee a greater incentive to win than the 
alleged infringer are termed the “public good problem” and “pass-through 
problem.”172 
The “public good problem” arises from the nature of a patent.  Any party 
wishing to challenge a patent’s validity must, if it wins, share its victory with 
the rest of the world, including its competitors.173  This forced sharing deters 
an alleged infringer’s incentive to see litigation to its finish, especially if there 
is an attractive settlement offer by the patentee.174  The “pass-through 
problem” arises from the effect of multiple infringers passing the royalties they 
must pay to use a patented method or device on to the consumer.175  The result 
of this effect is that even if all the infringers combined together, they still 
would not have as great an incentive to win in litigation as the patentee.176 
Farrell and Merges also pointed out other deterrents of challenging a patent 
in litigation.  If the alleged infringer loses, the court may order a permanent 
injunction against the infringer, forcing the infringer out of the market 
completely.177  Also, the patentee may charge higher royalties against 
 
 168. Id. at 1502.  A 1999 American Intellectual Property Law Association report estimated 
that the median cost of patent litigation is $799,000 for each side through the end of discovery 
and $1,503,000 for each side through trial and appeal.  Id. 
 169. Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why 
Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might 
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 943 (2004). 
 170. Id. at 948. 
 171. Id. at 948–49. 
 172. Id. at 948. 
 173. Id. at 952; Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for 
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 668 (2004).  Miller posits that giving a 
successful patent challenger a “cash bounty” will encourage the litigation of patents and thus 
reduce the social cost of having invalidly issued patents.  Id. at 704–05. 
 174. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 952; Miller, supra note 173, at 668. 
 175. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 953. 
 176. Id. at 953–54. 
 177. Id. at 956. 
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infringers who challenge the patent than against infringers who quietly pay 
royalties instead of challenging.178  Farrell and Merges believe this system 
encourages settlement in cases involving invalid patents.179  The result of all 
this is a high social cost created by invalid patents in the marketplace deterring 
others from using what should not have been patented in the first place.180  
Ultimately the cost is then borne by the public at large.181 
Empirical data shows that in litigation the patent holder has an advantage 
over the alleged infringer.  One study that included all final decisions on 
validity resulting in written opinions reported in the United States Patents 
Quarterly from 1989 through 1996 noted that 54% out of 300 decisions found 
the patent valid.182  This study also noted that 49 out of 73 (67.1%) patents 
tried before a jury were found valid, while 23 out of 82 (28.1%) patents 
decided on pre-trial motion were found valid, and 82 out of 143 (57.3%) 
patents tried in bench trials were found valid.183  Thus, a patent tried before a 
jury is more likely to be held valid than a patent tried before the court or 
decided on pre-trial motion.184 
Another study conducted from data of terminated patent cases compiled 
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts found that the 
patentee won 706 out of 1209 (58%) cases.185  This study also found the 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 968. 
 180. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 968. 
 181. Id.  The authors did propose solutions to the inadequacy of litigation to fix Patent Office 
errors, including improving Patent Office examination proceedings by regularly having more than 
one examiner assess an application and providing for a greater range of penalties for inequitable 
conduct to encourage the disclosure of information.  See id. at 960–63.  A greater range of 
penalties would make it more likely for courts to enforce inequitable conduct doctrine because a 
court may be reluctant to completely invalidate a patent in a close case.  Id. at 961. 
 182. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 187−88, 205 (1998).  This study did state that it could not predict 
with confidence the hypothesis that patents are more likely to be held valid than invalid, because 
the p-value for this test is greater than .1 which is an indication that there is no statistical 
significance in the hypothesis.  Id. at 206 & n.54. 
 183. Id. at 212.  The hypothesis that there is no difference between the likelihood of a patent 
tried to a jury, tried to a court, and resolved before trial being found invalid was rejected with a p-
value of less than .001 indicating statistical significance in the percentage differences.  Id. at 213. 
 184. See id. 
 185. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the 
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 380, 385 (2000).  In this study the hypothesis that either party 
has an equal chance of winning a patent lawsuit was rejected with a p-value of less than .01 
indicating a statistical significance in the percentage difference.  Id. at 385 & n.82. In the study, 
[a] case was considered won by the patentee if the patentee won at least one patent claim 
in its entirety.  If the patentee claimed two patents were infringed and the court concluded 
that one of the two patents was valid, enforceable, and infringed, it was considered a 
verdict for the patentee, even if the other patent was held invalid or not infringed.  If, 
however, the infringer prevailed on any issue with respect to each claim, it was considered 
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patentee win rate exceeded 68% for jury cases compared with a win rate of 
51% for bench trials.186  On the issue of validity, this study found that the 
patent holder won 775 out of 1151 (67%) times.187  Thus, based on this data 
set, a jury is more likely than a judge to find a patent valid, enforceable, and 
infringed.188  The study also found that an appellate court was unlikely to 
overturn the issue of validity, with 78% of 443 decisions upheld.189  Both of 
these studies show the patentee has an advantage in litigation over an alleged 
infringer.  This is another drawback in relying on the litigation system to bring 
to light withheld information.  Even with these problems, the adversarial nature 
of litigation makes it more effective at bringing out information than ex parte 
patent prosecution.190 
4. Reexamination Proceedings: An Ineffective Solution to High Cost 
Litigation 
In response to the problems of high cost patent litigation, Congress created 
the reexamination proceeding, which allows the patentee, a third party, or the 
PTO to request a reexamination of a patent in light of new information.191  
There are two types of reexamination proceedings—ex parte and inter partes.  
Ex parte reexamination, created in 1980, allows a third party to request a 
proceeding by citing to the PTO previously uncited prior art; but after the 
initial request for a new proceeding the third party is only given one more 
chance to respond to the patentee’s arguments before the proceeding is 
conducted like an initial examination without the third party.192  Because the 
 
a verdict for the infringer.  For example, if the patent was held valid and enforceable, but 
not infringed, this case would be considered won by the infringer. 
Id. at 385 n.81. 
 186. Id. at 386–87. 
 187. Id. at 390 tbl.4.  On the issue of validity, when broken down between judge and jury, the 
jury found the patent valid 389 out of 551 (71%) times and the judge found the patent valid 387 
out of 601 (64%) times.  Id. 
 188. See id. at 390. 
 189. Id. at 399 tbl.7. 
 190. Von Tersch, supra note 70, at 434. 
 191. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 965. 
 192. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (“Any person at any time may file a request for 
reexamination by the [PTO] of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art [patents or 
printed publications].”). 
If . . . the Director finds that a substantial new question of patentability affecting any 
claim of a patent is raised, the determination will include an order for reexamination of 
the patent for resolution of the question.  The patent owner will be given a reasonable 
period, not less than two months from the date a copy of the determination is given or 
mailed to him, within which he may file a statement on such question, including any 
amendment to his patent and new claim or claims he may wish to propose, for 
consideration in the reexamination. 
Id. § 304. 
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proceeding does not give the person requesting the reexamination a good 
opportunity to challenge the patent, less than 1% of issued U.S. patents are 
challenged by a reexamination request.193  Out of the less than 1% of patents 
challenged by reexamination, cancellation results in only 12.2% of the cases.194 
In response to the shortcomings of the ex parte reexamination proceeding, 
Congress created the inter partes reexamination proceeding in 1999.195  The 
inter partes reexamination differs from the ex parte in two principal aspects.  
First, the inter partes reexamination gives the party requesting reexamination 
the opportunity to file written comments every time the patent owner files a 
response to an action on the merits from the PTO.196  This gives third parties 
more of a say in the reexamination proceeding, which is the major drawback of 
the ex parte proceeding.  This new freedom comes at a cost as the second 
major difference is that after the inter partes reexamination the requester 
cannot revisit any issue raised in the proceeding in a later trial.197  Thus, the 
PTO’s determination in the inter partes reexamination is final.  Because of this, 
through 2003 there have been only twenty-six requests for inter partes 
reexamination.198  Therefore, given that the reexamination proceeding is 
infrequently used, it is not an effective means of correcting errors in the initial 
examination process and curbing high cost patent litigation. 
 
 193. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 966 (citing USPTO, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2003 119 tbl.13a, available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/com/annual/2003/2003annualreport.pdf).  The USPTO 2003 fiscal report also 
showed that in 2003 only 392 total requests for reexamination were filed and 239 out of the 392 
were requested by a third party.  Id. 
 194. Id. at 966 n.67 (citing Stuart J.H. Graham et al., Post-Issue Patent “Quality Control”: A 
Comparative Study of US Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8807, 2002)). 
 195. Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I, 
113 Stat. 1501A-567 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18 (2000)). 
 196. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)(3). 
Each time that the patent owner files a response to an action on the merits from the Patent 
and Trademark Office, the third-party requester shall have one opportunity to file written 
comments addressing issues raised by the action of the Office or the patent owner’s 
response thereto, if those written comments are received by the Office within 30 days 
after the date of service of the patent owner’s response. 
Id. 
 197. Id. § 315(c). 
A third-party requester whose request for an inter partes reexamination results in an order 
under section 313 is estopped from asserting at a later time, in any civil action arising in 
whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28, United States Code, the invalidity of any 
claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on any ground which the third-party 
requester raised or could have raised during the inter partes reexamination proceedings. 
Id. 
 198. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 967 (citing USPTO, supra note 193, at 119 
tbl.13b). 
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C. Minimizing Burden on Court System 
The legal standard used to determine whether inequitable conduct occurred 
is important because of the abundance of parties asserting the inequitable 
conduct defense in patent infringement actions.199  As the Federal Circuit noted 
“the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case 
has become an absolute plague.”200  A relaxation of the standard for materiality 
encourages alleged infringers to assert the defense when the facts of the 
situation may not support it.201  This results in inefficiencies in the court 
system, increased legal fees, and possible damage to the reputation of parties 
against whom the defense is asserted.202  Tightening the standard may 
discourage alleged infringers from asserting the defense, which could result in 
invalid patents in the market.203  This damages the patent system and the public 
at large by giving the holder of an invalid patent the right to prevent others 
from using what the patent holder had no right to patent.  Courts must strike a 
balance somewhere to prevent parties from withholding information while also 
keeping frivolous litigation from prolonging patent infringement actions. 
Instead of tightening the standard of materiality to reduce any perceived 
burdens on the court system, one commentator has argued that if the Federal 
Circuit gives more deference to the district courts’ decisions on inequitable 
conduct, the burden will lessen on the court system and it will create earlier 
certainty in a patent’s enforceability.204  Therefore, reducing the burden on the 
court system should be accomplished by giving more deference to district court 
decisions on inequitable conduct, and reducing the burden on the court system 
should be a secondary consideration in determining the standard of materiality. 
D. Conclusion 
The above discussion argues that the doctrine of inequitable conduct is best 
justified as punishment for an applicant who engages in dishonest activity and 
not as a tool to encourage applicants to reveal information.  The ideal test for 
materiality may differ based on which purpose the defense of inequitable 
conduct is trying to serve.  Because litigation has the ability to bring out 
 
 199. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 1, at 89; Lawrence R. LaPorte et al., New Rule 56, The 
Evolving Standard of Disclosure, and Litigation Sanctions Available for Inequitable Conduct, 
669 PRACTISING LAW INST. PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1163, 1168–69 (2001); Tegtmeyer, supra note 152, at 194. 
 200. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (vacating 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment for party asserting inequitable conduct where the facts 
did not show by clear and convincing evidence the patent attorney engaged in inequitable 
conduct). 
 201. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 89; Tegtmeyer, supra note 152, at 194. 
 202. See Lee, supra note 8, at 132; Anderson, supra note 3, at 846–47. 
 203. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 867–68. 
 204. Id. at 870. 
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withheld information, the proper standard of materiality should conform to the 
purpose of punishing bad behavior on the part of applicants before the PTO.  
There are some social costs in relying on litigation to bring out withheld 
information, but these hard-to-quantify social costs are not as high as expected 
because most valuable patents are litigated early in their life and bad patents 
with little value are not likely to deter competitors.205  Also, because the 
Federal Circuit giving greater deference to district court decisions can reduce 
the burden on the court system, reducing the burden on the courts should be a 
secondary consideration in determining the standard of materiality. 
V.  COURTS SHOULD USE THE REASONABLE PATENT EXAMINER STANDARD 
FOR MATERIALITY 
Since, as argued above, the primary purpose of inequitable conduct is to 
punish applicants for misrepresenting, withholding, or falsifying material 
information, the test used to determine what information is material should 
conform to that purpose instead of the purpose of making sure the patent 
examiner has all necessary information when examining the patent.  The courts 
should use the old Rule 56 subjective test to determine materiality because it is 
expansive enough to give the doctrine some teeth and it allows the court to 
make an equitable determination based on all the facts to decide whether or not 
withheld information is material.  Old Rule 56 states: “[I]nformation is 
material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner 
would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to 
issue as a patent.”206  The following sections analyze the shortcomings in the 
five tests that courts have used to determine materiality and support the 
conclusion that the Federal Circuit and PTO should adopt the old Rule 56 
reasonable examiner standard. 
A. “Objective But For” Test 
Courts have rejected the “objective but for” test because it is too narrow in 
its definition of what information is material.207  The Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals in Norton v. Curtiss stated, “Findings of materiality should not 
be limited only to those situations where there can be no dispute that the true 
facts . . . if they had been known, would most likely have prevented the 
allowance of the particular claims at issue . . . .”208  The court reasoned a 
subjective determination of materiality better fostered the necessary 
relationship of trust between applicants and the PTO by expanding the types of 
 
 205. Allison et al., supra note 162, at 460; Lemley, supra note 165, at 1531–32. 
 206. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977). 
 207. See, e.g., Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794–95 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 208. Id. at 795. 
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misconduct for which courts will penalize applicants.209  The court noted that 
honesty was so vital to the relationship between an applicant and the PTO 
because the PTO’s time constraints and lack of testing facilities force it to rely 
on applicants to provide complete and accurate information.210 
Thus, the “objective but for” test does not adequately serve the main 
purpose of inequitable conduct, to punish dishonest applicants, because the test 
is too narrow and does not include enough types of information.  With this test 
the doctrine of inequitable conduct would effectively have no teeth.  The test 
also does not help provide the PTO with all information needed to determine 
patentability because its strict standard does not discourage applicants from 
withholding information.  This test may be the best to keep frivolous 
inequitable conduct claims from creating a burden on the court system, but as 
argued above, this should only be a secondary consideration in determining 
which test courts should use. 
B. “Subjective But For” Test 
The shortcomings of the “subjective but for” test for materiality are 
illustrated in the American Cyanamid case discussed in Part III.B. above.  In its 
decision, the court stated that the patent examiner did not testify at the original 
hearing because it would have been against PTO policy.211  If this test is used 
to determine materiality there will be cases where the patent examiner is not 
available to testify.  This would make it nearly impossible to ascertain what 
effect any alleged misrepresentations had on the patent examiner’s decision to 
issue a patent.  If the examiner was unavailable, the only way to determine if 
the alleged misrepresentations had an effect on the examiner’s decision would 
be to look at the file history of the patent, from which it would be very difficult 
to extrapolate the examiner’s state of mind.212 
 
 209. Id. at 794. 
 210. Id. 
 211. American Cyanamid Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 363 F.2d 757, 778–79 (6th Cir. 1966); 
see MPEP, supra note 68, at § 1701.01 (“It is the policy of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) that its employees, including patent examiners, will not appear as 
witnesses or give testimony in legal proceedings . . . . Any employee who testifies contrary to this 
policy will be dismissed or removed.”).  The reasons for this policy are set out as follows: 
(a) To conserve the time of Department employees for conducting official business; (b) 
To minimize the possibility of involving the Department in controversial issues that are 
not related to the Department’s mission; (c) To prevent the possibility that the public will 
misconstrue variances between personal opinions of Department employees and 
Department policy; (d) To avoid spending the time and money of the United States for 
private purposes; (e) To preserve the integrity of the administrative process; and (f) To 
protect confidential, sensitive information and the deliberative process of the Department. 
15 C.F.R. § 15.13 (2005). 
 212. See Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243, 268 (D. Mass. 1955), aff’d, 237 F.2d 428 
(1st Cir. 1956) (“But from a broad consideration of the file wrapper of the patent as a whole, I 
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In terms of the purposes of inequitable conduct, the “subjective but for” 
test, like the “objective but for” test, does not encompass enough types of 
withheld information for the doctrine to effectively punish dishonest 
applicants.  The additional factor required to prove inequitable conduct using 
this test, reliance by the examiner on the applicant’s misrepresentations, makes 
this test even more impractical than the “objective but for” test.  Like the 
“objective but for” test, this test would discourage alleged infringers from 
asserting inequitable conduct, but because reducing the burden on the court 
system is only a secondary consideration, this factor alone should not be 
controlling. 
C. “But It May Have” Test 
In SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, discussed above in Part III.C., 
the court noted reasons why the test it formulated for materiality was 
correct.213  The court reasoned that the objective and subjective “but for” tests 
fail to discourage an applicant from withholding material information because 
it is impracticable for a court ruling in an infringement action to determine if 
the patent in suit would have issued if the applicant had disclosed all material 
information.214 
However, the “but it may have” test is highly speculative and gives the 
court too much latitude in making a determination of materiality.215  While this 
may seem to go along with the equitable nature of inequitable conduct 
doctrine, it makes it very difficult for patent attorneys and inventors to decide 
what they must disclose to the PTO.  This test would encourage applicants to 
disclose more material than necessary to make a determination on 
patentability, which would increase the time needed for the examiner to review 
the information, making the patent process less efficient. 
This test would definitely further the punishment purpose of inequitable 
conduct doctrine, but it goes too far.  Adopting this test for materiality would 
 
believe that the statement complained of, although factually untrue . . . . did not deceive or 
mislead the examiner in his consideration of the patentability of the application pending before 
him.”). 
 213. 318 F. Supp. 433, 449–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).  Later courts named the test the “but it may 
have” test.  E.g., In re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. 1353, 1368 (D. Del. 
1975). 
 214. SCM Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 449–50. 
Any other rule would fail adequately to discourage conduct of this sort merely because of 
the circumstance, which must be present in many cases, that it turns out to be 
impracticable to ascertain what the Examiner, who did not know the true facts, would 
have done if he had known them. 
Id. 
 215. Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont’l Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 900 (10th Cir. 1979).  The court 
concluded the “but it might have been” test is too speculative and the “subjective but for” test is 
more practical.  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND THE STANDARD OF MATERIALITY 1357 
strongly encourage alleged infringers to assert inequitable conduct on the hope 
that a court will find a possibility that withheld information may have had an 
effect on patentability. 
D. Current Rule 56 Objective Test 
The PTO promulgated the new Rule 56 standard in order to reduce the 
amount of inequitable conduct defenses litigated before the Federal Circuit and 
also to provide greater certainty in the field of inequitable conduct.216  The 
PTO hoped the new rule would result in less inequitable conduct litigation, 
thus reducing the expenses of litigation for a patent owner.217 
Several commentators have stated that the Federal Circuit should adopt the 
new Rule 56 standard in order to provide earlier certainty and greater 
uniformity in patent actions.218  Commentators have also stated that the new 
standard would help to discourage frivolous claims of inequitable conduct.219  
However, a more stringent test, such as the new Rule 56 standard, would result 
in a patent applicant disclosing less information than under a broader 
standard.220  The disclosure of less information would give the PTO less 
information on which to base the decision of whether or not to grant a patent. 
Although the new Rule 56 standard appears to help discourage applicants 
from asserting frivolous claims of inequitable conduct, thus reducing the 
burden on the court system, adoption of the new standard would give courts 
less leeway in determining whether or not inequitable conduct occurred based 
on the specific facts of a case.  In this respect the new Rule 56 does not 
adequately punish dishonest applicants.  It is more desirable for the Federal 
Circuit to keep the old Rule 56 standard in order to give the district courts 
broad discretion in making determinations on what is material. 
E. Old Rule 56 Subjective Test 
In the late 1980s the patent bar noted a need to change the law on 
inequitable conduct because the old Rule 56 test encouraged alleged infringers 
 
 216. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 95. 
[The rule] change recognizes to some degree the unnecessary problems and expenses that 
are caused when questions of inequitable conduct arise in litigation based on allegedly 
withheld or misrepresented information not affecting patentability.  The standard of 
materiality under prior Rule 56 was less definite and certain and broader.  There was, 
therefore, more of an opportunity for a defendant to question the patentee[’]s conduct 
before the PTO. 
Tegtmeyer, supra note 152, at 194. 
 217. Tegtmeyer, supra note 152, at 194. 
 218. See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 97, at 633; Anderson, supra note 3, at 864–65. 
 219. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 3, at 865.  Anderson reasoned that frivolous claims 
would be discouraged “because clients would be less inclined to pay for defenses that have no 
chance of succeeding.”  Id. 
 220. See id. at 867–68. 
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to charge patentees with inequitable conduct.221  While the “reasonable patent 
examiner” test sought to promote candor and fairness, commentators noticed 
problems with the test such as: (1) it created confusion and uncertainty as to 
the enforceability of patents, thus encouraging litigants to assert the defense of 
inequitable conduct, even if the facts did not support the defense, (2) it denied 
patents to many worthy inventions, (3) it made settlements more difficult, and 
(4) it diverted attention away from the merits of the case.222  Commentators 
also believe that under the old Rule 56 test it is hard for applicants to determine 
what is required of them in their dealings with the PTO.223 
Even with these perceived shortcomings in the old Rule 56 reasonable 
patent examiner test, this test best furthers the main purposes of inequitable 
conduct.  This test does the best job of balancing between being expansive 
enough to effectively punish dishonest applicants while at the same time not 
creating a large burden on the court system.  If the main purpose of inequitable 
conduct doctrine is to punish dishonest applicants, then it is most beneficial to 
have a test for materiality that is expansive enough to give the court more 
discretion in making an inequitable conduct determination.  Under a 
punishment rationale for inequitable conduct, more discretion is desired 
because in the circumstance where an applicant has high levels of intent to 
deceive, but a low level of materiality, a court should find the applicant 
engaged in inequitable conduct.  If the court does not have adequate discretion 
under the materiality standard however, then the low level of materiality may 
not rise above the threshold level needed and the court cannot find the 
applicant engaged in inequitable conduct. 
The two main purposes that inequitable conduct doctrine should serve are: 
(1) punishment and (2) reducing the burden on the court system.  The more 
expansive definitions do a better job at punishing dishonest applicants, while 
narrower definitions help reduce the burden on the court system and promote 
the certainty of patents.  Organizing the tests along this spectrum from 
expansive to narrow would look like this: “but it may have”; old Rule 56 
reasonable patent examiner; new Rule 56 prima facie patentability; “subjective 
but for”; and “objective but for.”  Because, as argued above in Part IV, the 
primary purpose of inequitable conduct doctrine is to punish dishonest 
applicants, a rule that serves that purpose more than the purpose of reducing 
the burden on the court system is the best choice.  Even though the “but it may 
have” test gives the court more discretion to find materiality in a given 
circumstance, it is too speculative.  Because reducing the burden on the court 
 
 221. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 88–89. 
 222. Id. at 89; see LaPorte et al., supra note 199, at 1168–69. 
 223. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 95; Lee, supra note 8, at 132 (“The words ‘important’ and 
‘reasonable’ [mean] different things to different judges and juries in different parts of the 
country . . . .”). 
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system is still a secondary consideration, the “but it may have” test is not the 
best choice for the materiality standard. 
Two of the reasons why the PTO changed Rule 56 in 1992 are: (1) the old 
Rule 56 made it too difficult for practitioners to realize what was required of 
them under the standard, and (2) the old Rule 56 standard was too expansive, 
which encouraged alleged infringers to charge inequitable conduct with every 
possible piece of related information they could find.224 
In response to the first objection, that practitioners do not know what the 
PTO expects of them under the old Rule 56, for any rule it will be hard to 
determine exactly what information the applicant must disclose.  It is 
impossible to draft a rule that can consider every possible type of information 
for every different scenario.  Thus, a rule allowing a court to make an equitable 
determination on what information is material best serves the policy of 
punishing dishonest applicants. 
In response to the second objection—that the standard is a drag on 
litigation because it encourages alleged infringers to charge inequitable 
conduct—the fact that an issue comes before a court frequently is not 
necessarily a bad thing as long as the rule is best suited to further the policy 
behind it.  There needs to be some punishment for dishonesty before the PTO 
because of the social implications involved in obtaining the right to exclude.  
This punishment is best served by an expansive definition of materiality, which 
allows a court to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. 
One commentator on new Rule 56, in an article released a year after the 
1992 change in Rule 56, stated that because of the diverse facts that come up in 
inequitable conduct cases, true uniformity may not be possible, and it is best to 
leave the standard for inequitable conduct up to the district courts to determine 
on an equitable basis.225  In response to the drag on litigation, this commentator 
asserted that limiting the number of reversals for abuse of discretion is the best 
way to reduce the number of appeals.226  The short paragraph in that article 
effectively sums up the argument here that the Federal Circuit should use the 
old Rule 56 reasonable patent examiner standard of materiality because it 
furthers the main purpose of inequitable conduct—punishing dishonest 
applicants—by giving the court more discretion to determine if withheld 
information is material. 
The standard of materiality will continue to be the old Rule 56 reasonable 
examiner standard for patents pending before March 16, 1992, and the new 
Rule 56 standard for patents pending on or filed after March 16, 1992, unless 
the Federal Circuit decides to adopt a different rule.  Administrative change in 
 
 224. See Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (Jan. 17, 1992); Anderson, supra note 
3, at 864–65. 
 225. Goldman, supra note 1, at 88. 
 226. Id. 
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the PTO’s Rule 56 is not binding on the court system, but the Federal Circuit 
has chosen to follow the PTO’s Rule 56.  The best way to clarify the standard 
of inequitable conduct and set it in stone would be a statutory change, which is 
a possibility given that the Patent Reform Act of 2005 garnered significant 
attention and review while purporting to give statutory guidance to inequitable 
conduct determinations.227 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Clarifying the standard of materiality in inequitable conduct proceedings is 
important so that patent attorneys and their clients know what the PTO expects 
of them.  There are three primary purposes that the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct must serve: (1) to punish dishonest applicants, (2) to make sure the 
examiner has all pertinent information, and (3) to reduce the burden on the 
court system and promote the certainty of patents.  Because the second 
purpose, making sure the examiner has all pertinent information, can 
adequately be served by litigation, and the third purpose, reducing the burden 
on the court system, can be accomplished by the Federal Circuit giving district 
courts more discretion in their inequitable conduct determinations, the standard 
of materiality should seek to serve the first purpose of inequitable conduct, 
punishing dishonest applicants. 
Out of the five tests courts have used to determine materiality, the Federal 
Circuit and PTO should adopt the old Rule 56 reasonable patent examiner 
standard.  This standard is the best balance between punishing dishonest 
applicants while not creating too much of a burden in the court system.  It 
gives district courts broad discretion to determine if an applicant engaged in 
inequitable conduct during patent prosecution.  District courts need this 
discretion to make an equitable determination, based on all the facts at hand, 
on whether or not the applicant engaged in inequitable conduct.  If the standard 
was narrower, then in an instance where an applicant had a high level of intent 
to deceive (and thus under the punishment rationale a court should find 
inequitable conduct occurred) and a low level of materiality, the court would 
be bound by the narrow standard of materiality and would not be able to 
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